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Cert to CA 5
(Tuttle, Coleman
and Ainsworth)
. Federal/Criminal

V •

~(.01(.S .

Timely

The United States seeks review of the decision

~tt-Qu..,L ·/.s Afe

of CA 5 affirming the DC (W.D. Texas) (Spears) decision that

di vu:-lec{ ,

testimony given by resp before a grand jury had to be sup-

-~~

pressed in subsequent prosecutions for making false declaratio~s

.----------

---

before a grand jury, 18 U.S.C.

1/

.

§

1623, and attempting to

- MR. JUSTICE POWELL extended the time for filing until December
15, 1974, a Sunday. The petition was filed on the next day.

- 2 -

distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 846.

II

The CA and DC

decisions were based upon the holding that resp was a
"putative defendant" entitled to Miranda warnings prior to
being questioned before the grand jury, that the warning
given was inadequate, and that the conduct of the prosecution

-

was unfair.

It therefore found that the questioning before

t he grand jury had violated the resp's due process rights and
thus that the testimony given had to be suppressed.

The SG

takes issue with each of these holdings.
2.

FACTS:

A federal narcotics officer had reported

that he had offered resp $650 for the purchase of heroin, that
resp took the money but was unable to obtain any h~roin, and
that consequently resp returned the money to the officer.
,- was subsequently called before a grand jury.

Resp

The government

attorney conducting the questioning before the grand jury
testified later that he had talked to the agent involved before
resp was questioned at the grand jury session.

Resp appeared

pursuant to subpoena and was given the following warning:

"Q:

Now you are required to answer
all the questions that I ask you except
for the ones that you feel would tend
to incriminate you. Do you understand
that?
"A: Do I answer all the questions
you ask?

2/

- The government proceeded to trial in its case against resp
under§ 846, and resp was convicted. That conviction was
affirmed by CA 5, and resp's petition here in No. 74-5441 was
denied on January 13, 1975.

- 3 -

I,

"Q:

You have to answer all the
questions except for those you think
will incriminate you in the commiss ion of a crime. Is that clear?
"A:

Yes, sir.

"Q: You don't have to answer
questions which would incriminate you.
All other questions you have to answer
openly and truthfully. And, of course,
if you do not answer those truthfully,
in other words, if you lie about
certain questions, you could possibly
be charged with perjury."
Resp was then questioned about whether anyone had attempted
to buy heroin from him or whether he had tried to sell any
heroin to anybody.

Resp answered that no one had tried to

buy heroin from him and that he had not tried to sell any.
The government attorney used the figure $650 at one point in
. the questioning.
The DC, after the suppression hearing, concluded that
resp was a "virtual" or "putative" defendant at the time of the
questioning.

It rejected the government's argument based upon

the representation that no prosecution of resp was contemplated
prior to the grand jury testimony, and that the file in the · case
was closed:
"The transcript of the grand jury
proceedings reveals deliberate and
careful attention to questions which
specifically delved into the facts
concerning these contacts between the
defendant(s) and government agents.
The special attorney was aware that
no case had been made, and though this
Court does not presume any improper
motives on the part of the government
agents or the special attorney, it

- 4 -

strains cre dulity to suggest that
the special attorney did not have one
eye on a possible prosecution of
11
the defendants." (Footnote omitted.)
The DC held that resp had not completely, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his right to remain silent.

He had not

properly been told of that right, nor of his right to have
appointed counsel outside the grand jury room.

Miranda

warnings are required whenever a putative defendant was called
to testify, that is, one as to whom the prosecution had plans
to indict, it was gathering evidence against, and it had focused
specifically upon as a potential defendant.

That test -had been

met here.
The CA affirmed.

It accepted that DC's findings that

at the time of the testimony the government had knowledge of
resp's involvement in criminal activity, that resp was a person
whom the government had plans to indict, that the prosecution
had been gathering evidence against resp, and that at the time
that the questions were asked the government knew that affirmative
answers would amount to a confession.

The prosecution put .resp

in a position of confessing or committing perjury, since it had
not adequately informed him of his right to remain silent.

3/

- Resp's motion to suppress was considered with that of one
Rangel. Rangel's motion to suppress was also granted and
affirmed. The SG has not pursued cert there because, he says,
the warning given Rangel was confusing and ambiguous and contained an implicit threat that he would be held in contempt if
he wrongly declined to testify.

- 5 Moreover , i f the government's questions were intended to
acquire information about sources of heroin, it could have
asked questions about heroin dealers without asking whether
resp had been involved in any sales.

As a putative defendant,

resp was entitled to Miranda warnings.

Suppression was re-

quired despite the charge of perjury because the action of the
prosecution had been unfair.
3.

CONTENTIONS:
a.

The SG argues that no Miranda warnings should

be required in this situation, since resp was not being compelled
to incriminate himself.

The fact that a witness is suspected

of criminal involvement does not make his answers to questions
before the grand jury involuntary.
,- Fifth Amendment privilege.

Resp could have invoked his

The oppressiveness of custodial

interrogation is not present in the grand jury room.

Because of

knowledge of resp's prior activity, the government was entitled
to call him as a witness; he clearly could have knowledge of
sources of heroin.
b.

There was nothing unfair in this questioning.

Assuming that some warning must be given a

"putative" defendant, the warning given here was sufficient.
Witnesses are not entitled to a right to remain silent.

They may

claim the privilege against self-incrimination, but even then they
may be compelled to testify if they are given sufficient immunity
for their answers.

The right to appointed counsel recognized

by the CA conflicts with this Court's ruling that the right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment begins with "[t]he initiation

- 6 -

of j udicia l criminal proceedings."
406 U.S . 682, 689 (1972).

Kirby v. Illinois,

Since the questioning here is

very different from the custodial interrogation involved

-

in Miranda, there is not the same need for having appointment
of counsel here.
c.

The SG contends that resp was not a putative

defendant at the time of the grand jury questioning.

The

proper test for determining whether a witness is a putative
defen J ant is a combination of objective and subjective features:
"there must be sufficient evidence to support an indictment at
the time the witness is called, and it must also be established
that the witness was in fact a target of the grand jury's tnvestigations whom the prosecutor expected to be indicted."
d.

The CA created an exception to the long-standing

rule that the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be
used as a license for perjury.
U.S. 139, 142 (1911).

Glickstein v. United States, 222
'

There is a conflict among the circuits on

the treatment of testimony given before the grand jury when the
government charges that it constitutes perjury and the defendant
was not given full warnings.

CA 5 here and CA 9 in United States

v. Wong, cert. pending, No. 74-635, have suppressed the testimony.
CA 2, CA 7, and CA 10 have taken the contrary position.
citations in petn, at 18 n. 10.
suppression here.

See

There is no good reason for

The procedure was not unfair; the government

had good and legitimate reasons for calling resp before the
grand jury.

It is an unlikely deterrent, since few prosecutors

I

'

~

- 7 "woul d risk losing the use of confessions or other
i ncriminating evidence for the sake of obtaining evidence
of perjur y . "
4.

DISCUSSION:

The issues of whether warnings

mus t be given to putative defendants called before the grand
jury and, if insufficient warnings are given, whether the
testimony given should be suppressed in a later perjury trial
aris i ng from the grand jury testimony are also presented in
Uni ted State s v. Wong, supra, No. 74-635, in which there has
been a call for a response.

This case may well be the better

one for consideration of these issues, since the warning issue
in Wong is complicated by the question whether the witness
linguistically understood the warning given.

It would appear

,· that a response should be requested in this case also and that
Wong and this case should hereafter be considered together.
There is no response.
1/28/75
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Motion of Respondent
for Appointment of Counsel

No. 74-754
UNITED STA TES

v.
MANDUJANO
On March 24, the Court granted cert t
review its affirmance of a USDC trial order s

Coleman, Ainsworth)" to
res sing resp 1 s grand jury testiJ.nony

on grounds that the Government had failed to give him Miranda warnings to which he
was entitled as a

11 putative 11

or

11 virtual 11

defendant.

Counsel for resp, Michael Alle~

-

sq. of Houston, Texasi requests

that he be appointed to represent resp in this Courto

Counsel avers that:

(1) he was

appoi:qted under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 to represent resp in CA 5; (2) that he
is fully familiar with the issues presented in this case; and (3) that he is a member of
the Texas bar.
4/4/75
PJN

------

Mr. Peters is not a member of the bar of this Court.
Goltz

Conference 4-18-75

.,,
Court
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Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No.

74-754

UNITED STATES, Petitioner
vs.

ROY MANDUJANO

12/16/74
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Supreme Court of the United State8
M emor1,"'.,dum

April 23
75 __
------------------------------------, 1g ______
Justice Powell:
Judge Spears called. He gave
me a message - if you need to know
anything further, feel free to call
him. The Judge received the
following information about
Michael Peters from Ben Connolly
in Houston, and from the Clerk of
the Court of Appeals.
Mr. Peters
graduated from law school (U. of
Houston L.S.) about a year ago,
was admitted to practice in
Houston in June, 1974.
His
address is 1217 Calhoun Street,
Houston, Texas 77002.
Judge Connolly tried to
get in touch with other Judges but
this seems to be about the extent
of the information about Mr.
Peters. They seem to feel that
he is a young, new lawyer, who

r-

..___,

Supreme Court of the United State8
Mem01 - ndum
-------- -----------------------------, 1g ________

2.

submitted his name to be Court
appointed.
None of the Judges
seem to know what type of work
he does.
The Judge (Judge Spears)
said to tell you not to worry
about how you pronounce Spanish
names - from a South Carolinian
to a Virginian - he has an awful
time pronouncing the Spanish names
he has to deal with.
g

April 24, 1975

No. 74-754 United States v. Mandujano
Dear Mike:
As you know, the Conference authorized me to appoint
counsel in the above case.
Although I have been able to obtain relatively little
information on Michael Allen Peters, he wom the case in the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit where he had been
appointed to represent the indigent defendant.
Accordingly, I have decided to appoint him to continue
this representation before us.

In this connection, I note that he is not licensed to
practice before this Court, but I believe we make exceptions
in cases like this.
Sincerely,

Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr.
lfp/ss

..

lfp/ss

9/1/75

No. 74-754

United States v. Mandujano

The purpose of this memo, dictated during the sunnner,
is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and to record
my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of the
opinions below.

This case presents, broadly, questions as to whether
Miranda warnings must be given a "putative defendant" called
as a witness before a grand jury, and whether - if warnings
are required - a failure to give them should result in the
suppression of the witness' testimony in a subsequent
prosecution for perjury.

CA5 (Tuttle) answered these questions

against the government.
Respondent was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury
investigating narcotics traffic.

At the time, t he prosecutor

knew from a government informer that respondent has received
$650 from the informer and attempted to purchase heroin.
Prior to respondent's testimony,he was advised by the prosecutor
as follows:

Q. ***Now you are required to answer all
the question that I ask you except for the ones that
you feel would tend to incriminate you. Do you
understand that?
A.

Do I answer all the questions you ask?

Q. You have to answer all the questions except
for those you think will incriminate you in the
connnission of a crime. Is that clear?

2.
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. You don't have to answer questions which
would incriminate you. All other questions you have
to answer openly and truthfully. And, of course, if
you do not answer those truthfully, in other words,
if you lie about certain questions, you could possibly be charged with perjury. Do you understand that?
A.

Yes, sir.

The prosecutor then asked respondent if he had talked to
anyone about selling heroin, had promised to obtain and sell
heroin to anyone, or had accepted $650 to buy heroin for anyone.
Respondent flatly denied involvement in any such events or
activities.
Respondent was subsequently indicted for attempting to
distribute heroin, and on a second count for perjury.

On

respondent's motion to suppress his testimony on the ground
that he had not received full Miranda warnings, the DC"found"
as a fact that respondent was a putative or virtual defendant
when called before the grand jury and therefore was entitled
to the warnings.

CAS affirmed, relying on the DC's finding

that defendant was a "virtual" or putative defendant.
CAS held that the warnings given by the prosecutor did
not meet the full Miranda requirements; that the prosecutor's
conduct was therefore unfair and violative of due process,
and that the DC was correct in suppressing respondent's
perjured testimony.

~

3.

Position of the Government
The SG's brief states the government's position as
follows:
"The decision of the court of appeals turns
upon three conclusions, each of which must be
correct in order to support suppression of
respondent's allegedlz perjurious grand jury
testimony: (1) that putative defendants' should
be given full Miranda warnings before testifying
to a grand jury; (2) that respondent was a putative
defendant; and (3) that his testimony was properly
suppressed for use in a prosecution based upon its
alleged falsity. We contend that the court erred
in its disposition of each of these three issues."
The first and third "conclusions"of CAS present the
critical issues in this case.
Miranda warnings
The SG argues, with considerable force, that the
characteristics of grand jury questioning are not comparable
to the type of incommunicado police interrogation described
by the police in Miranda.

A grand jury interrogation takes

place before 23 private citizens, the proceedings are usually
recorded (as they were in this case); there is no opportunity
for the use of physical force or threats; and a judge is
standing by to intercede if necessary.

Although respondent

did not have a lawyer outside of the grand jury room, he had
been advised by the prosecutor that he was entitled to have
such a lawyer for consultation.

(See SG's brief p. 5).

4.
Respondent had stated, however, that he did not have
money to engage a lawyer and he was not advised of entitlement
to a free lawyer.
Moreover, the SG notes that the Miranda warnings would
not apply in two important respects to a grand jury witness:
(1) a grand jury witness has no absolute right to remain silent,
except to the extent that he invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege;
and (2) the Constitution does not confer upon an unindicted
grand jury witness a right to appointed counsel.

See In re

Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 332-333; and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682.
Reliance is placed particularly on the language of the
Fifth Amendment:
"No person . . . shall be comhelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against imself . . . . "
In view of the fact that the government attorney expressly
warned respondent that "you don't have to answer questions
which would incriminate you", the SG argues that there was
no compulsion.

Putting it differently, although a grand jury

witness is under compulsion to testify when subpoenaed, this
does not extend to self incrimination.

Although an ignorant

witness, without benefit of counse~ might - even at a time in
history when "taking the Fifth" is a household phrase - not
be aware of the privilege, this respondent had been expressly
advised of this right.

s.
The SG disputes the DC's finding, accepted by CAS, that
respondent was a "putative defendant", but goes on to argue
that this is really immaterial.

In view of the differences

between grand jury and police interrogation, Miranda~type
warnings are not required regardless of whether the witness
is a likely prospect for prosecution.
Reliance is placed on United States v. Monia, 317 U.S.
424, 427 to the effect that a grand jury witness "must claim
• . . [the privilege] or he will not be considered to have
been compelled within the meaning of the Amendment."
Suppression in a Perjury Prosecution?
The second major issue in this case is whether, assuming
failure to give the appropriate warnings, respondent's
testimony conceded to be false for purposes of this case must be suppressed in this prosecution for perjury?
The SG argues that this holding of CAS is warranted
neither by policy nor precedent.

It is clear to me that it

is unjustified as a matter of policy.

.

for litigation and escap~

A vast new opportunity

uccessful prosecution would be

opened up if the ~ !holding is affirmed by this Court.
Grand jury witnesses would insist, when prosecuted, that they
had been inadequately warned, and particularly that · they had
been denied the benefit of counsel. Indeed, inherent in the
warning
Miranda/requirement is the right of indigents to the advice
of counsel at the expense of the state.

Extending this right

6.

to every witness before a grand jury who might conceivably
be prosecuted at a later date, would represent a significant
departure from custom and precedent in the administration of
criminal justice.
The SG cites, but with a minimum of analysis, several
decisions of this Court as supportive of the position that
the Fifth Amendment does not endow the person who testifies
[not having invoked the Fifth] with a license to commit
perjury."

Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142.

I must read these cases.
Position of Respondent
Judge Tuttle's opinion in this case is quite persuasive
on its face.

As would be expected, respondent relies heavily

,~ . an d h.is b rie
. f a dd snoth.i n g to it.
.
on --r~~
s.,. opinion

Th ere is
.

emphasis on the argument that respondent in effect was
"entrapped", that the prosecutor knew perfectly well that
~
respondent was a target for prosecution, that the interrogation
A

was violative of "fundamental fairness".
Viewed in one sense, this is a rather appealing argument especially where the witness (as in the case of respondent)
had only a 10th grade eduation, and was not counseled by an
attorney.

7.
Comments
As is evident from the above, I lean rather strongly
toward the government's position in this case.

Whatever may

be said negatively about a grand jury proceedings, it is not
fairly comparable to the inherently coerceiv e nature of the
police interrogation which prompted the Miranda rule.
I am inclined to think that the historical, as well as
the practical, differences between grand jury and police
interrogation suffice to support the government's position
that the Miranda doctrine should not be extended to all grand
jury questioning.
I have not thought this through, but if CAS is right in
its reasoning would not most of its logic apply also to
witnesses before congressional and other bodies possessing
investigatory and subpoena powers?

To be sure, CAS's opinion

can be distinguished on the ground that respondent was a
"putative defendant" whereas witnesses before legislative
bodies are not.

I am not entirely persuaded, however, that

this makes any difference.

Whether the government intends

to prosecute a witness is not a fact easily ascertainable.
Indeed, frequently it is not a "fact" at all.

If this were

the test, courts would be compelled to inquire into the
subjective intent of prosecutors - an inquiry unlikely to
respond to reliable factfinding.

Moreover, it is not clear

to me that a witness who may be a suspect is entitled to more

8.

warning than a witness, guilty of crime, of which the government either had no knowledge or merely vague suspicions.

I

would think the consequences of connnitting perjury should be
the same in both situations.
In all of this, I continue to remind myself that the
public interest is to arrive at the truth with respect to
criminal activities and, particularly, in the prosecution of
a particular defendant.

The Fifth Amendment has been extended

far beyond its meaning as originally understood.

I am not

presently inclined to extend its reach further to protect
perjurers, especially those who have been expressly warned
of their right not to incriminate themselves.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

pj/ss
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BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Phil Jordan
No. 74-754

DATE:

October 23, 1975

United States v. Mandujano

I recommend that CA5 be reversed.
As your aid-to-memory memorandum states, there are really
two main issues.

First, whether a "putative defendant" must

be given Miranda warnings before being questioned by a grand
jury.

Second, assuming a positive answer to the first question,

whether failure to give such warnings requires subsequent
suppression of his grand jury testimony even in a perjury
prosecution founded upon that very testimony.
I.

Suppression in a Perjury Prosecution

The narrowest ground for reversal is that failure to
give Miranda warnings to a putative defendant (a ssuming arguendo
that such warnings are required and that Mandujano was in fact
a putative defendant) does not require suppression of subsequent
testimony in a perjury prosecution based on that testimony.
The government makes two distinct arguments in favor of this
result.

One argument, that suppression is needlessly drastic

in this situation, is based on a premise that prosecutors,
unlike the police involved in custodial interrogations of
suspects, can be relied upon to do their duty and give the
warnings.

~
would still
The premise may be correct.~suppression

2.
be an effective remedy when violations did occur, and would
interfere with few prosecutions if prosecutors in fact usually
did give the warnings.
The government's second argument is that the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination permits a person to clam
up but does not give him a license to lie.

Neither CA5 nor

Respondent really meets this argument head-on; instead, they
pursue a due process analysis and argue that it is simply
someone before a grand jury
"unfair" to bring/and question him about a crime the government
"knows" he corrnnitted.

The alleged unfairness lies in the

resulting "Robson's choice" between admitting guilt or committing perjury.
Before dealing with the government's argument about the
self-incrimination privilege, I want to urge especially that
you reject CAS's "due process" argument.

The argument is

one version of an often-made attack on the use of the grand
jury to "trap" people into corrnnitting perjury.

For another

variation, see the amicus brief of Richard Kelly at 3-6, complaining of the practice of calling suspects and grilling
them mercilessly until they "slip up" and perjure themselves.
All of these complaints about misue of the grand jury system
are valid, but the abuses are not subject to correction by
constitutional adjudication.

The only way to reach them

under the Constitution is through the due process clause,
as CAS tried to do.

But such due process attacks always wind

up sounding as strained as did CAS's, for all one can do is

3.
cite cases like Rochin (the stomach-pumping case) and then
rant and rail against the unfairness evidenced by the "totality
of the circumstances."

I strongly believe that we are just

going to have to recognize that the grand jury system can be
abused, and that for correction of such abuses we must look
to the good faith of prosecutors and to the judges who oversee the proceedings.
Beyond my bias against use of the due process clause
there is another problem with CAS's opinion.

CAS ran right

by the fact that a person in Ma:ndujano's shoes has a third
choice in addition to incriminating himself or committing
perjury:

-

him.

he can refuse to answer if answering would incriminate

Thus, as long as the witness knows of his privilege

against self-incrimination, it is unnecessary to resort to
CAS's due process argument to protect him from being "trapped"
into perjury.

vi,,

This holds true regardlessAhow bad the

prosecution's motive in hauling the witness before the grand
jury, for the witness can always thwart the prosecutor simply
by invoki ng the Fifth.
CAS and Respondent do doubt would counter my point in
the last paragraph by arguing that a person confronted with
a grand jury and a hostile prosecutor fee).s himself "compelled"
to answer, so that in effect he does not have the "choice" of
remaining silent.

I just don't buy that argument.

To accept

it would undercut every perjury indictment stemming from a
grand jury.

Every indictee could argue that he would have

4.
invoked the Fifth except for the compulsion to answer.

I do

not see how a grand jury setting could be considered more
"coercive" for a putative defendant than for an ordinary
witness, so I see no way to allow the putative defendant to
plead CAS's "Robson's choice" but . deny the same plea to other
witnesses.
With CAS's due process argument to one side, the remaining
question is the validity of the government's own argument that
failure to give Miranda warnings should not affect a subsequent
perjury prosecution.

As noted earlier, the government's basic

contention is that the privilege against self-incrimination
permit one to lie.

I
• __ OJJ-

~ ~
,,,,o
D .AA>-~'
~

II

doe..s~ot

I will grant that contention,* but it

*United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969), appears to support
the government's position. In Knox, a defendant prosecuted
for false statements on wagering tax forms argued that he
could not be convicted because he had the right, under the
Fifth Amendment holdings in Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968),
not to fill out the forms at all. The Court held that he
could not assert the Marchetti-Grosso privilege as a defense
in his prosecution. Although Justice Harlan's opinion seems
uncharacteristically opaque, I believe it stands for the
proposition that the Fifth Amendment gives one no rivile e
to res ond wit fa
instea o not respon ing a a 1.
See
U.S. at 82.
- - The other two cases heavily relied upon by the government do not seem to support its position as well. In Brtson
v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969), the Court stated tat
a union official could be prosecuted for falsely denying
corrnnunist affiliation on a form required by the NLRB, even if
the demand for the information as to corrnnunist affiliation were
improper. The case seems weaker authority than Knox because
the Court's statement was not a clear holding (tneway I read
the case). But the Court did make this statement:
Our legal system provides methods for challenging
the Government's right to ask questions - lying is
not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the
question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with
impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a
falsehood.

5.
does not settle the suppression issue.

The argument for

suppression even in a perjury prosecution actually is based
not on the Fifth Amendment privilege itself, but on the need
to enforce the requirement of Miranda warnings.

Just as the

Miranda warnings are considered so important in custodial
interrogations that failure to give them results in suppression
of all subsequent statements, it would be a reasonable 2osition

tt,g_, ~
(}/}

t/))

to suppress everything a putative defendant says unless the
~~rnings had been given.

It boils down to a policy decision:

,• - ~hould the sanction for failure to give the warnings be as

~ ~ tough as possible, or should the sanction stop short of the
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If the former, suppress even the perjurious statethe latter, allow prosecutions for subsequent perjury.

I would allow prosecutions for perjury.

The policy of

denying the prosecutor the use of the testimony seems outweighed by three factors.

First, if the testimony cannot be

used there is no way~ to bring the witness to trial for
the crime of perjury, since the perjurious statements themselves form the basis of prosecution.

This differs from the

case where either grand jury testimony of some previous crime
or a stationhouse confession is suppressed, for in those

396 U.S. at 72.

The final case, Glickstein v. United States,
222 U.S. 139 (1911), stands for no more than the obvious
proposition that a person who has been granted immunity in
return for his statements has not been granted immunity from
perj,ury prosecutions for any subsequent falsehoods. That
proposition has been reaffirmed often.

6.
instances diligent detective work could turn up other evidence
on which to prosecute.

Second, perjury usually leads the grand

jury astray in its inquiry.

Allowing the grand jury to be

sidetracked would be a high price to pay in order to effectuate
Miranda.

And third, it would just stick in the craw to let

a fellow off who lied under oath, even if the prosecutor did
err in failing to give the warnings.

It is of overriding

importance, I think, to uphold the sanctity of the oath.
II.

Miranda Warnings

If you wish to eschew the narrow ground of decision set
out above, you can tackle the issue of whether Miranda warnings
are required at all.

--

I am of the firm opinion that they are

not.
It is important to keep separate two distinct arguments

for requiring Miranda warnings in the case of the "putative
defendant."

The first argument amounts only to a technical

extension of Miranda, but the second finds its genesis in the
basic distaste for the grand jury system that I alluded to
above.
The first argument, that the putative defendant before
the grand jury is somehow "like" the suspect in police custody,
just does not persuade me.

It must be emphasized that the

Miranda warnings are prophylactics, granting to the suspect
rights beyond those required by the Constitution itself, for
the purpose of insuring that he will be free to exercise the

7.
constitutional rights that he does have.

For instance, there

is no constitutional right to remain completely silent when
questioned by police, but Miranda grants that right in order
to make easier the assertion of the constitutional right not
to incriminate oneself.

Nor is there, probably, a constitutional

right to have an attorney at initial stationhouse questioning,
but Miranda grants that right also in order to protect the
constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Prophylactics

were deemed necessary in Miranda because of the inherent
coercive effect of stationhouse interrogationsu~o• street
criminals, who usually are ill-educated and intimidated by
the police; and because of the opportunity in the stationhouse
setting for undiscoverable actual coercion.
The only way to justify transferring the Miranda requirements to the grand jury room is to equate that room to the
stationhouse in its potential for inherent coerciveness and
undiscoverable actual coercion.
not be made.

The equation just should

Whatever inherent coerciveness does exist in

the grand jury setting has been built into the system
intentionally, in the belief that society must be able to
find out the truth about crime in the solemn amnosphere of
a structured investigation by ordinary citizens.

It would

repudiate the historical judgment in favor of grand juries
to say now that the elements of coercion purposely designed
into the system necessitate the granting of a right to absolute
silence - which right, if exercised, would thwart the grand

8.

jury's function.

The other bothersome element of station-

house interrogation, the opportunity for undiscoverable actual
coercion, does not exist in the grand jury setting.*
(My rejection of the equation between custodial police

interrogations and grand jury interrogation (even of the
"putative defendant") means only that it is unnecessary to
grant~ than the constitutional privilege against self
incrimination in order to protect the exercise of that privilege.
It says nothing about a wholly different question:

whether

the inherent coerciveness of the grand jury setting, admittedly
sanctioned historically and necessary to the investigative
process,nevertheless requires that the witness be advised of
his privilege against self-incrimination.

This is a much

tougher question than whether Miranda warnings are necessary.
I only want to flag it now, and will discuss it later in
the memorandum).
The second argument for requiring that Miranda warnings
be given to the "putative defendant" is based, as noted
earlier, not on alleged coerciveness of grand jury questioning,
but on distaste for the use of the grand jury.

The argument

is that without a requirement of Miranda warnings the
-,\-on this point it must be emphasized that "actual coercion"
refers to the type of coercion that overbears one's will so as
to make any incriminating statemen~ involuntary. A finding of
such coercion has always required evidence of outrageous tactics
like beating or trickery or isolation. None of this could occur
in the grand jury room. The kinds of coercion that might occur the steady gaze of the prosecutor, the tension and fatigue from
answering question upon question - are only elements of the
inherent and historically sanctionelcoercion of the process, and
do not rise to the level of actual coercion that has been found
in the past to violate due process.

9.

authorities can h4~l a person before the grand jury whom
they have probable cause to arrest, not tell him their
suspicions, and question him in hopes that he will give even
more incriminating evidence.

This procedure amounts to an

end run on Miranda, for if the police were to take the person
into custody for questioning they would have to give the
warnings.
In general, I happen to favor this procedure.

If one

assumes, as I do, that grand jury questioning is less conducive
to abuse by the authorities and inherently less coercive than
custodial interrogation, then there is no need for Miranda
warnings if the police choose to go to the grand jury instead
of questioning the suspect themselves.

There is only one

respect in which the practice of taking unsuspecting potential
defendants before the grand jury does bother me.

Such a

person, unaware of the police suspicions, may answer questions
that he would refuse to answer if he knew that he was a prime
suspect.*

1

To avoid this (which smacks a bit of t rickery to

me), it is worth considering a requirement that
inform a person of his status.**

the prosecut~r

Aside from that one troubling

*For instance, a person who did not know he was a suspect might
see nothing dangerous about answering a question concerning his
associations with X. If he knew he was himself a suspect, however, he might add 2 plus 2 and realize that his answers could
incriminate.
**Of course, such a requirement would raise the problem of pinpointing the moment when a person becomes such a prime suspect,
the same problem that is raised by CAS's requirement that a
"putative defendant" receive Miranda warnings. This is a
strong counterargument against requiring that a prime suspect
be advised of that fact.

10.
point, however, I see nothing wrong with taking putative
defendants before the grand jury.

They are still protected

by the Fifth Amendment privilege like anyone else.

(Moreover,

I see no constitutional barrier to taking even an indicted
defendant before the grand jury.
as his protection.

He, too, would have the privilege

Forcing him to appear before the grand jury

does not involve the danger of forcing him to take the stand
at trial, for in the case of the grand jury the inevitable
inference of guilt that arises when someone invokes the Fifth
Amendment would not be drawn by the ultimate fact-finders.
If even an actual defendant could be taken before the grand
jury, certainly a putative one can be.)
III.

l

Should a Grand Jury Witness Be Advised
of his Fifth Amendment Privilege?

You should seriously consider requiring that every grand
jury witness be advised of his F~fth Amendment privilege,
simply as a prophylactic measure to insure that he knows of
it.

Such a requirement would not hinder the grand jury inquiry

in any way.

And even though "taking the Fifth" is a household

phrase, some people still do not know of the privilege and
others who do know of it think that it cannot be asserted before
a grand jury.

No societal interest is served when a person

fails to utilize a constitutional privilege out of ignorance.
Furthermore, such an advisement of the privilege would help
offset the inherent coerciveness of the grand jury setting,
which, although necessary and historically intended, no doubt

11.
does intimidate some people into forgetting that they can refuse
to answer some questions.
Two points should be made about this suggestion.

First,

it would apply across the board to all grand jury witnesses
rather than just to putative defendants.

In terms of inherent

coerciveness, there is no difference between the putative
defendant and another witness.

Second, advising a witness of

his privilege is a wholly different matter from giving him
Miranda warnings.

Miranda warnings give him more than the

constitution; advising him of the constitutional right itself
obviously does not.*
It is my understanding that most prosecutors already
advise witnesses of their privilege.

Given that fact, and

the fact that Mandujano was advised of it in this case, it
would be possible

oJ~o.S~

~

insure adherence to this salutary

practice in the future without the necessity of laying down
a prophylactic rule.

If the opinion were written to emphasize

*The government argues that it is unnecessary to advise a
witness of the privilege because (1) the privilege is
freedom from "compelled" self-incrimination only, and (2)
the grand jury does not "compel." I disagree with them on
the second point. My understanding is that a person is
"compelled" if he must answer, and a grand jury witness must
answer or face contempt. I believe the government is trying
to equate the word "compelled" in the Constitution's statement of the privilege, to the concept of "coercion" in the
cases that suppress confessions on due process grounds.

I

12.
that Mandujano was advised fully (as I believe he was),
prosecutors would get the message.

This technique would be

preferable to laying down a prophylactic rule, for the latter
would give new grounds for suppression of probative evidence.*
IV.

Who Is a Putative Defendant?

If the case is decided on one of the two grounds above
(no need for Miranda warnings, or no need for suppression of
perjurious testimony in any event), the question of identifying
the putative defendant will not be reached.

If it is reached,

however, I would urge adoption of a purely objective standard
such as CAS's, rather than the objective/subjective one pressed
by the government.
consistency.

Only the former could be applied with any

The latter standard, moreover, would allow the

prosecutor to do exactly what he claims to have done here:
decide to indict after the grand jury appearance on the s ame
evidence that was available before, apparently out of pique
"w ,-1-nc.ss 1
at the witness' grand jury behavior.** Here, tnezgrand jury
performance included perjury, so I would not be too concerned
*Testimony given to the grand jury in the absence of advisement of the privilege would still be probative because it would
not have been coerced in violation of due process. Such
coercion is what undercuts the probative value of statements.
**The government's argument that at the time of his appearance
Mandjuano was not a putative defendant because the prosecutor
did not know that his known actions constituted a crime , is
the strangest thing I've heard yet. I could just see that as
a basis for a "nonputative defendant" holding in U.S. Reports!

13.
that the prosecutor retaliated.

But in another case he might

decide to prosecute because he got mad

at the witness'

invocation of the Fifth Amendment before the grand jury and that would bother me.

P.J.
ss
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-754
1Jnited State

P~titigner1 ] On Writ of Certiorari to th~
v.
United ~tate1:.1 Court of Ap ..
Roy M;andujano,
peals for the :Fifth Circuit,
i

[January -, 1976]

lVIfl. CHIElF JusTic:m BURGER delivereq th~ opiniqn gf
the Court.
This case presents the question whether the warnin~
called for by Miranda v. United States, 384 U. S. 436
(1966), must be given to a grand jury witness who is
called to testify about criminal activities in which he
ma.y have been personally involved; and whether, absent
such warnings, false statements made to the grand jury
must be suppressed in a prosecution for perjury based
on those statements.
(1)

During the course of a grand Jury investigation into
narcotics traffic in San Antonio, Tex., federal prosecu..
tors assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration
Task Force learned of an undercover narcotics officerls
encounter with respondent in March 1973. At that
time, the agent had received information that respondent, who was employed as a bartender at a local tavern,
was dealing in narcotics. The agent, accompanied by
an informant, met respondent at the tavern and talked
for several hours. During the meeting, respondent
agreed to obtain heroin for the agent, and to that end
placed several phone calls from the bar. He also requested and received $650 from the agent to make the
purchase. Respondent left the tavern with the money

..
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so advanced to secure the heroin. However, an hour
later rnspondent returned to the bar without narcotics
and ret\}rned the agent's money. Respondent instructed
the agent to telephone him at the bar that evening to
make arrangements for the transaction. . The agent tried
but was unable to contact respondent as directed. The
record provides no explanation for respondent's failure
to keep his appointment. No further action was taken.
by the agent, and the investigatory file on the matter
was closed. The agent did, however, report the information to federal prosecutors. At that time, the Government was seeking information on local drug traffic
to present to a special grand jury investigating illicit
traffic in the area.
Respondent was subpoenaed to testify before the grand
jury on May 2, 1973; this was approximately six weeks
after the abortive narcotics transaction at the tavern
where respondent was employed. When called into the
grand jury room and after preliminary statements, the
following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and
respondent :
"Q. Now, you are required to answer all the questions that I ask you except for the ones that you
feel would tend to incriminate you. Do you
understand?
11
A. Do I answer all the questions you ask?
"Q. You have to answer all the questions except
for those you think will incriminate you in the
commission of a crime. Is that clear?
(!A. Yes, siro
"Q. You don't have to answer questions which
would incriminate you. All other questions you
have to answer openly and truthfully. And, of
course, if you do not answer those [questions] truthfully, in other words if you lie about certain ques-

~:

~·-

..

.·•· ,

,,

,.

"1',1

1 '.
1

.

.

>

74-754-0PINION
UNI'.J;'ED STATES v. MANDUJANO

3

tions, you could possibly be charged with perjury.
Do you understand that?
"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Have you contacted a lawyer in this matter?
"A. I don't have one. I don't have the money
to get one.
"Q. Well, if you would like to have a lawyer, he
cannot be inside this room. He can only be outside.
You would be free to consult with him if you so
chose. Now if during the course of this investigation, the questions that we ask you, if you feel you
would like to have a lawyer outside to talk to let
me know."
During the questioning respondent admitted that he
had previously been convicted of distributing drugs, that
he had recently used heroin himself, and that he had
purchased heroin as recently as five months previously.
Despite this admitted experience with San Antonio's
heroin traffic, respondent denied knowledge of the identity
of any dealers, save for a streetcorner source named Juan.
Respondent steadfastly denied either selling or attempting to sell heroin since the time of his conviction 15 years
before.
Respondent specifically disclaimed having discussed the
sale of heroin with anyone during the preceding year and
stated that he would not even try to purchase an ounce
of heroin for $650. Respondent refused to amplify on
his testimony when directly confronted by the prosecutor :
"Q. Mr. Mandujano, our information is that you
can tell us more about the heroin business here in
San Antonio than you have today. Is there any-

·..

,,

'14-754-0PINION
' .,

UNITED STATES v. MANDUJANO

~-

thing you would like to add telling us more about
who sells heroin?
uA. W'ell, sir, I couldn't help you because, you
know, I don't get along with the guys and I just
can't tell you, you know.''
Following this appearance, respondent was charged by
a grand jury on June 13, 1973, in a two-count indictment with attempting to distribute heroin in violation of
21 U. S. C. §§ 841 (a)(l), 846, and for willfully and
knowingly making a false material declaration to the
grand jury in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1623. 1 The
falsity of his statements was conceded; his sole claim was
that the testimony before the grand jury should be suppressed because the Government failed to provide the
warnings called for by Miranda. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted respondent's
motion to suppress. The court held that respondent was a
"putative" or "virtual" defendant when called before the
grand jury; respondent had therefore been entitled to full
Miranda warnings. 365 F. Supp. 155 (WD Tex. 1973).2
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 496 F. 2d 1050 (CA5
1974) . It recognized that certain warnings had in fact
1 Count 2 of the indictment charged that the following decla,rations were materially false :
"Q. Have you talked to anyone about selling heroin to them
during the la.st year?
"A. No, sir.
" Q. And you have never told anyone that you would try to get
heroin to sell to them?
"A. No, sir,
"Q. No one has ever given you any money .. ..
"A. No.
" Q. . . . to go buy them heroin?
"A No, sir."
2
Respondent was subsequently tried and convicted under Count I
of the indictment for attempting to distribute heroin. The grand
jury testimony was not utilized by the prosecution at that trial.

I,
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been given to respondent at the outset of his grand jury
appearance. But the court agreed with the District
Court that "full Miranda warnings should have been
accorded Mandujano who was in the position of a virtual
or putative defendant." Id., at 1052. The essence of
the Court of Appeals' holding is:
" In order to deter the prosecuting officers from bringing a putative or virtual defendant before the grand
jury, for the purpose of obtaining incriminating or
perjurious testimony, the accused must be adequately apprised of his rights, or all of his testimony,
incriminating and perjurious, will be suppressed."
Id., at 1056. (Emphasis added.)
In so ruling, the court undertook to distinguish its
own holding in United States v. Orta, 253 F. 2d 312
(CA5 1958) , in which Judge Rives, speaking for the
court, stated that a grand jury witness
u . • • might answer truthfully and thereafter
assert the constitutional guaranty, Under no circumstances, however, could he commit perjury and
successfully claim that the Constitution afforded
him protection from prosecution for that crime. As
said in Glickstein v. United States,' ... the immunity
afforded by the constitutional guaranty relates to
the past, and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.'" Id., at 314.
(Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.)
In the Orta opinion, Judge Rives went on to observe:
"The only debatable question is one of the supervision of the conduct of Government representatives
in the interest of fairness. In United States v.
Scully, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held :
6
' ', • • the mere possibility that the witness may
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later be indicted furnishes no basis for requmng
that he be advised of his rights under the Fifth
Amendment, when summoned to give testimony
before a Grand Jury.'
"That holding is applicable to the present record.
There is no showing that the Grand Jury before
which Orta testified was seeking to indict him or
any other person already identified." Ibid. (Citations omitted.)

..

,'

'

The Court of Appeals concluded that the "totality of
the circumstances" commanded suppression of all the
testimony on which the charge of perjury rested.
We disagree and reverse.
(2)
The grand jury is an integral part of our constitutional
heritage which was brought to this country with the
common law. The Framers, most of them trained in
the English tradition, accepted the grand jury as a basic
guarantee of individual liberty; notwithstanding periodic
criticism, the grand jury continues to function as a.
barrier to reckless or unfounded charges. "Its adoption
in our Constitution as the sole method for preferring
charges in serious criminal cases shows the high place it
held as an instrument of justice." Costello v. United
States, 350 U. S. 359, 362 (1956). Its historic office has·
been to provide a shield against arbitrary or oppressive·
action, by insuring that serious criminal accusations will
be brought only upon the considered judgment of a representative body of citizens acting under oath and under·
judicial instruction and guidance.
Earlier we noted that the law vests the grand jury·
with substantial powers, because "[t]he grand jury's investigative powers must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged." United States v~

,.
,.
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Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 344 (1974); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 700 (1972) . Indispensable to the
exercise of its power is the authority to compel the attendance and the testimony of witnesses, Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972), and to require
the production of evidence. United States v. White, 322
U. S. 694 (1944) .
When called by the grand jury, witnesses are thus
legally bound to give testimony. Calandra, supra, at 343.
This principle has long been recognized. In United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases No. 14,692e, at 3~
Chief Justice Marshall drew on English precedents,
aptly described by Lord Chancellor Hardwick in the 18th
Century, and long accepted in America as a hornbook
proposition : "The public has a right to every man's evidence." This Court has repeatedly invoked this fundamental proposition when dealing with the powers of the
grand jury. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 709
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 688; Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S., at 443; United States v. Mania,
317 U. S. 424, 432 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The grand jury's authority to compel testimony is not,
of course, without limits. The same Amendment that
establishes the grand jury also guarantees that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself...." The duty to give evidence
to a grand jury is therefore conditional; every person
owes society his testimony, unless some recognized privilege is asserted.
Under settled prmc1ples, the Fifth Amendment does
not confer an absolute right to decline to respond m a grand Jury inquiry; the privilege does not
negate the duty to testify but simply conditions that
duty . The privilege cannot, for example, be asserted by
a witness to protect others from possible criminal prosecution Royer,'! v United States, 340 U. S. 367 (1951) ;

T
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United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U . S. 43 (1906). Nor can it be invoked
simply to protect the witness' interest in privacy. "Ordinarily, of course, a witness has no right of privacy before
the grand jury." Calandra, supra, at 353.
The very availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege to grand jury witnesses, recognized by this Court in
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892), suggests that occasions will often arise when potentially
incriminating questions will be asked in the ordinary
course of the jury's investigation. Probing questions to
all types of witnesses is the stuff that grand jury investigations are made of; the grand jury's mission is, after all,
to determine whether to make a presentment or return
an indictment. "The basic purpose of the-English grand
jury was to provide a fair method for instituting criminal
proceedings against persons believed to have committed
crimes." Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., at 362.
It is in keeping with the grand jury's historic function
as a shield against arbitrary accusations to call before it
persons suspected of criminal activity, so that the investigation can be complete. This is true whether the grand
jury embarks upon an inquiry focused upon individuals
suspected of wrongdoing, or is directed at persons suspected of no misconduct but who may be able to provide
links in a chain of evidence relating to criminal conduct
of others, or is centered upon broader problems of cqn"
cern to society. It is entirely appropriate-indeed imperative- to summon individuals who may be able to
illuminate the shadowy precincts of corruption and crime.
Since the subject matter of the inquiry is crime, and
often organized, systematic crime- as is true with drug
traffic-it is unrealistic to assume that all of the witnesses capable of providing useful information will be

.

,.
',,
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•
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pristine pillars of the community untainted by
criminality.
The Court has never ignored this reality of law enforcement. Speaking for the Court in Kastigar v. United
States, MR. JUSTICE POWELL said :
" [M] any offenses are of such a character that the
only persons capable of giving useful testimony are
those implicated in the crime." 406 U. S., at 446
(1972) .
MR. JusTICE WHITE made a similar observation in the
context of a state investigation :
" [T]he very fact that a witness is called .. . is
likely to be based upon knowledge, or at least a suspicion based on some information, that the witness
is implicated in illegal activities ... ." Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378
U S. 52, 102 (1964) (concurring opinion) .
Moreover, the Court has expressly recogniz9d that" [t]he
obligation to appear is no different for a person who may
himself be the subject of the grand jury inquiry."
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 10 n. 8 (1973) .
There 1s nothmg new about the Court's recognition of
this reality of grand Jury inquiries. In one of the earliest
cases dealing with the Fifth Amendment privilege, the
Court observed : " [I] t is only from the mouths of those
having knowledge of the [unlawful conduct] that the
facts can be ascertained.'' Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.
591, 610 (1896) .
Accordingly, the witness, though possibly engaged in
some criminal enterpnse, can be required to answer before a grand jury, so long as there is no compulsion to
answer questions that are incriminating; the witness can,
of course, stand on the privilege, assured that its protection "is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks

·.
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to guard." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., at 562.
The witness must invoke the privilege, however, as the
"Constitution does not forbid the asking of criminative
questions." United States v. Mania, 317 U. S., at 433
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) .
"The [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion.
It does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him. If,
therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege,
he must claim it or he will not be considered to have
been 'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment." 317 U. S., at 427.

I

Absent a claim of the privilege, the duty to give testimony remams absolute.
The stage is therefore set when the question is asked.
If the witness interposes his privilege, the grand jury has
two choices. If the desired testimony is of marginal
value, the grand jury can pursue other avenues of
inquiry ; if the testimony is thought sufficiently important, the grand jury can seek a judicial determination
as to the bona fl.des of the witness' Fifth Amendment
claim, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S., at 11-12; Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486-487 (1951), in which
case the witness must satisfy the presiding judge that
the claim of privilege is not a subterfuge. If in fact
" there 1s reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the
witness from his being compelled to answer," Brown v.
Walker, 161 U. S., at 599, the prosecutor must then
determine whether the answer is of such overriding
importance as to justify a grant of immunity to the
witness.
If rmmumty is sought by the prosecutor and granted
by the presiding judge, the witness can then be compelled to answer, on pain of contempt, even though the

74-754-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. MANDUJANO

11

testimony would implicate the witness in criminal
activity. The reason for this is not hard to divine;
Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated as much in opining
that immunity is the quid pro quo for securing an
answer from the witness: "Immunity displaces the
danger." Ullman v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 439
(1956); see also Piemonte v. United States, 367 U. S.
556, 560 (1961). Based on this recognition, federal
statutes conferring immunity on witnesses in federal
judicial proceedings, including grand jury investigations,
are so familiar that they have become part of
our "constitutional fabric." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U. S. 70, 81-82 (1974); Ullman v. United States, 350
U. S., at 438. Immunity is the Government's ultimate
tool for securing testimony that otherwise would be protected; unless immunity is conferred, however, testimony may be suppressed, along with its fruits, if it
is compelled over an appropriate claim of privilege.
United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 255 (1966). On
the other hand, when granted immunity, a witness once
again owes the obligation imposed upon all citizens-the
duty to give testimony-since immunity substitutes for
the privilege.
In this constitutional system for securing a witness'
testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the
basic concepts of judicial proceedings. Effective restraints against this type of egregious offense are
therefore imperative. The power of subpoena, broad
as it is, and the power of contempt for refusing
to answer, drastic as that is-and even the solem~
mty of the oath-cannot insure truthful answers.
Hence, Congress has made the giving of false answers
a criminal act punishable by severe penalties; in no other
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way can criminal conduct be flushed into the open where
the law can deal with it.8
Similarly, our cases have consistently-indeed without
exception-allowed sanctions for false statements or per.,
jury; they have done so even in instances where the
perjurer complained that the Government exceeded its
constitutional powers in making the inquiry. See, e. g.,
United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77 (1969); Bryson v.
United States, 396 U. S. 64 (1969,); Dennis v. United
States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966); Kay v. United States, 303
U. S. 1 (1938); United States v. 'Kapp, 302 U. S. 214
(1937),
In Bryson, a union officer was required by federal labor
law to file an affidavit averring that he was not a Communist. The affidavit Bryson filed was materially false.
In a collateral attack on his conviction, Bryson argued
that since the statute ~equired him either to incriminate
himself or lie, he could not lawfully be imprisoned for
failure to comply. This Court rejected the contention:
ic [I] t cannot be thought that as a general principle
of our law a citizen has a privilege to answer fraudulently a question that the Government should not
have asked. Our legal system provides methods for
challenging the Government's right to ask questions-lying is not one of them." 396 U. S., at 72.
(Citation omitted.)
Even where a statutory scheme granted blanket immunity from further use of testimony, the Court has

'·

,,

Congress' view was expressed in the legislative history of thegeneral perjury statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1621 :
"A subpoena can compel the attendance of a witness before a
grand jury or at trial. . . . But only the possibility of some sanction
such as a perjury prosecution can provide any guarantee that hist,estimony will be truthful." S. Rep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st
Bess,, 57 (1969 ),
8

~\

~
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found perjured statements to fall outside the grant. In
Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139 (1911), a
bankrupt was indicted for perjury committed in the
course of a bankruptcy proceeding. The Bankruptcy
Act expressly conferred broad immunity on a bankrupt:
u, • , no testimony given by him shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding." Id., at
140-141. The Court rejected Glickstein's literalistic
interpretation of the statute as conferring immunity from
prosecution for perjury :
u[T]he sanction of an oath and the imposition of
a punishment for false swearing are inherently a
part of the power to compel the giving of testimony,
they are included in that grant of authority and
are not prohibited by the immunity as to selfincrimination.
u[I]t cannot be conceived that there is power to
compel the giving of testimony where no right exists
to require that the testimony shall be given under
such circumstances and safeguards as to compel it
to be tru thfuL
11

[T]he immunity afforded by the constitutional
guarantee relates to the past and does not endow
the person who testifies with a license to commit
perjury." Id., at 141-142,
(3)

In this case, the Court of Appeals required the suppression of perjured testimony given by respondent, as
a witness under oath, lawfully summoned before an investigative grand jury and questioned about matters
directly related to the grand jury's inquiry. The court
reached this result because the prosecutor failed to give

... ;
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Miranda warnings at the outset of Mandujano's interrogation. Those warnings were required, in the Court of
Appeals' view, because Mandujano was a "virtual" or
"putative" defendant-that is, the prosecutor had specific information concerning Mandujano's participation
in an attempted sale of heroin and the focus of the grand
jury interrogation, as evidenced by the prosecutor's questions, centered on Mandujano's involvement in narcotics
traffic. The fundamental error of the prosecutor, in the
court's view, was to treat respondent in such a way as
to "smack of entrapment"; as a consequence, the court
concluded that "elemental fairness" required the perjured testimony to be suppressed. 496 F. 2d, at 1058.
The court's analysis, premised upon the prosecutor's
failure to give Miranda warnings, erroneously applied
the standards fashioned by this Court in Miranda. Those
warnings 4 were aimed at the evils seen by the Court as
endemic to police interrogation of a person in custody. 5
Mfranda addressed extra-judicial confessions or admissions procured in a hostile, unfamiliar environment which
lacked witll.Qw~ procedural safeguards. The decision expressly rested on the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination; the prescribed warnings sought to negate
the "compulsion" thought to be inherent in police station interrogation. But the Miranda Court simply did
"At the outset, if a person [in police custody] is to be subjected
Lo interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal
-terms that he has the right to remain silent . . . . The warning
of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anythmg sajd can and will be used against the individual
in court . . . . An individual held for interrogation must be clearly
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to
have the lawyer with him during interrogation. . . . [I]t is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with
an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him." 384 U. S., at 46,7-473.
5 3R4 U. S , at 444, n. 4.
4

.,. '
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not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial interrogation
as equivalents: " . . . the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater
than in courts or other official investigations, where there
are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.'' Miranda, supra, at 461.
The Court thus recognized that many official investigations, such as grand jury questioning, take place in a setting wholly different from custodial police interrogation.
Indeed, the Court's opinion in Miranda reveals
a focus on what was seen by the Court as
police "coercion" derived from "factual studies [relatmg to] police violence and the 'third degree' ... physical brutality-beating, hanging, whipping-and to sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in
order to extort confessions . . .. " Miranda, supra, at 445446. To extend these concepts to questioning before
a grand jury inquiring into criminal activity under the
guidance of a ,iudge is an extravagant expansion never
remotely contemplated by this Court in Miranda. The
dynamics of constitutional interpretation do not compel
constant enlargement of every doctrine announced by the
Court.
The marked contrasts between a grand jury investigation and custodial interrogation have been commented on
by the Court from time to time. Mr. Justice Marshall
observed that the broad coercive powers of a grand jury
are justified, because " ... in contrast to the police-it
1s not likely that [ the grand jury] will abuse those
powers." United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 45-46
(1973) ( dissenting opinion). See also In re Graban, 35Z
L1 . S.. at 347.
(4)
The warnings volunteered by the prosecutor to respondent in this case were more than sufficient to infor:rn

. .
•
~
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him of his rights-and his responsibilities-and particularly of the consequences of perjury. To expand the
concepts of Miranda, as contemplated by the Court of
Appeals, would require that the witness be told that
there was an absolute right to silence; obviously any
such warning would be incorrect, for there is no such
right before a grand jury. Under Miranda, a person in
police custody has, of course, an absolute right to decline to answer any question, incriminating or
innocuous, see Michigan v. Mosley, - U.S. (1975),
whereas a grand jury witness, on the contrary, has an
absolute duty to answer all questions, subject only to
a valid Fifth Amendment claim. And even when the
grand jury witness asserts the privilege, questioning need
not cease, except as to the particular subject to which
the privilege has been addressed; compare Michigan v.
Mosley, supra, at - ; other lines of inquiry may properly be pursued.
Respondent was also informed that if he desired
he could have the assistance of counsel, but that
counsel could not be inside the grand jury room. That
statement was plainly a correct recital of the law.
No criminal proceedings had been instituted against respondent, hence the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
had not come into play. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972). A witness "before a grand jury cannot insist, as
a matter of constitutional right, on being represented by
counsel. .. ." ln re Graban, 352 U. S., at 333. 6 In addition, under settled principles the witness may not insist
upon the presence of his attorney in the grand jury room.
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6 (d) .
Respondent, by way of further explanation, was also

;.
'•
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6 The right to counsel mandated by Miranda was fashioned to
secure the suspecfs Fifth Amendment privilege in a setting thought
inherently coercive, The Sixth Amendment was not implicated,
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warned that he could be prosecuted for perjury if he
testified falsely. Since respondent was already under
oath to testify truthfully, this explanation was redundant; it served simply to emphasize the obligation already imposed by the oath.
"Once a witness swears to give truthful answers,
there is no requirement to 'warn him not to commit
perjury, or conversely to direct him to tell the truth.'
It would render the sanctity of the oath quite meaningless to requite admonition to adhere to it."
United States v. Winter, 348 F. 2d 204, 210 (CA2
1965). (Emphasis added.)
See also United States v. Nickels, 502 F. 2d 1173, 1176
(CA7 1974) .
Similarly, a witness subpoenaed to testify before a
petit jury and placed under oath has never been entitled
to a warning that, if he violates the solemn oath to "tell
the truth," he may be subject to a prosecution for perjury, for the oath itself is the warning. Nor has any
case been cited to us holding that the absence of such
warnings before a petit jury provides a shield against use
of false testimony in a subsequent prosecution for perjury
or in contempt proceedings.7
In any event, a witness sworn to tell the truth before
a duly constituted grand jury will not be heard to call
for suppression of false statements made to that jury,
any more than would be the case with false testimony
7 The fact that warnings were provided in this case to advise respondent of his Fifth Amendment pnvilege makes it unnecessary to
consider whether any warning is required, as the Government asks
us to determine. In addition to the warning implicit in the oath,.
federal prosecutors apparently make it a practice to inform a witness of the privilege before questioning begins. This salutary praot.ice for_ecloses challenges sui.:h. at$ respondent make.s hei:e,,
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before a petit jury or other duly constituted tribunal. 8
In another context, this Court has refused to permit a
witness to protect perjured testimony by proving a
Miranda violation. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S.
222 ( 1970), the Court held that notwithstanding a
Miranda violation:
"[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perjury."
Id., at 225.
More recently, the Court reaffirmed this salutary
principle:
"[T]he shield provided by Miranda is not to be
perverted to a license to testify inconsistently, or
even perjuriously, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances." Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 723 (1975).
See also Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954);
United States v. DiGiovanni, 397 F. 2d 409, 412
(CA7 1968); Cargill v. United States, 381 F. 2d 849

1

Masinia v. United States, 296 F. 2d 871, 877 (CA8 1961) .
Cases voiding convictions for perjury involved situations where the
investigatory body was acting outside its lawful authority. Brown
v. United States, 234 F . 2d 549 (CA8 19.57) ; United States v.
Thayer, 214 F. Supp. 929 (Colo. 1963) ; United States v. Cross,
170 F. Supp. 303 (DC 1959); United States v. Icardi, 140 F . Supp.
383 (DC 1956) . For example, in Brown v. United States, the
Court of Appeals concluded that a federal grand jury in Nebraska
had undertaken a "roving commission," investigating matters outside its lawful power. The District Court in that case had concluded that the grand jury's activities had come "perilously close
to being a fraud on the jurisdiction of this Court." Quoted at 245
F. 2d, at 553. No such circumstances are presented by this case.
We therefore have no occasion to address the correctness of the:
results reached by the courts m these inapposite instances.
8

..
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(CAlO 1967); United States v. DiMichele, 375 F. 2d 959,
960 (CA3 1967).
The fact that here the grand jury interrogation had
focused on some of respondent's specific activities does
not require that these important principles be jettisoned;
nothing remotely akin to "entrapment" or abuse of
process is suggested by what occurred here. Cf. Brown
v. United States, 245 F. 2d 549 (CA8 1957). Assuming,
arguendo, that respondent was indeed a "putative defendant," that fact would have no bearing on the validity
of a conviction for testifying falsely.
The grand jury was appropriately concerned about the
sources of narcotics in the San Antonio area. The attempted heroin sale by respondent provided ample reason to believe that he had knowledge about local peroin
suppliers. It was, therefore, entirely proper to question
him with respect to his knowledge of narcotics trafficking.0 Respondent was free at every stage to interpose
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, but
perjury was not a permissible option. As the Tenth
Circuit has held, the law provides "other methods for
challenging the government's right to ask questions."
United States v. Pommerening, 500 F. 2d 92, 100 (CAIO
1974).
This is not to suggest that the questioning would have been
improper if the principal aim of the grand jury's investigation had
centered upon respondent's activities, rather than a general investigation into local na,rcotics traffic. As previously indicated, no
impropriety results from summoning the target of · its inquiry;
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S., at 10 n. 8; it is appropriate,
in fact, to give that individual :i,n opportunity to explain potentially
damaging information before the . grand jury decides whether to
return an indictment. As previously noted, see n. 2, supra, respondent's grand jury testimony was not allowed in evidence to establishthe &uhttantive charge,
9
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed.
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United States v. Mandujano

Dear Potter:
Will you please join me in your separate concurring
opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart

cc:

The Conference

'

<!fourl of tlrt ~~ .jhd:ts
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF" JUSTICE

/

April 13, 1976

Re: No. 74-754 - United States v. Mandujano

Dear Potter:
I have your concurring opinion in this case and I am not clear ·
as to precisely what troubles you. We granted cert because both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals held Miranda warnings essential as a predicate to convict a grand jury witness for perjury. Thus
it seems to me that the Miranda is sue is properly reached in this case.
Both the proposed opinion and Bill Brennan's concurring opinion
recognize that attacks upon perjury convictions may be appropriate
or, at the very least, that such attacks have succeeded in the past.
11
My opinion, for example, notes:
[N]othing remotely akin to
'entrapment' or abuse of process is suggested by what occurred
here." Bill's opinion makes an analogous point:
"Further, the record satisfies me that the respondent's
false answers were not induced by governmental tactics
or procecures so inherently unfair under all the cir·c umstances as to constitute • • . a violation of the Due
Process Clause . . . . "
These views have found expression in both the district courts and
the courts of appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Thayer, 214 F.Supp.
929 (D.Colo. 1963). See also United States v. Wong, No. 74-635, which
is being held for Mandujano. Other courts faced with perjury convictions
have embarked upon searching jurisdictional inquiries to determine
whether the questions propounded to the witness exceeded the investigatory body's authority. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d
549 (CA 8 1957); Masinia v. United States, 296 F.2d 871 (CA 8 1961).
Consequently, there is a body of law to the effect that a perjury
conviction can be overturned under certain circumstances, albeit very
limited. Indeed, I would presume that, whatever the outcome in
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Mandujano, it would remain open for a defendant to attack a perjury
charge on the ground that an overbearing prosecutor coerced him to
answer even after a valid claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
If a witness validly interposes the privilege, then the Government is
powerless to order the person to answer without a grant of immunity.
If the prosecutor thus were to exceed his power and extract an answer
potentially inculpatory (after assertion of the privilege and without
providing immunity), would we automatically assume that the witness
had no defense whatever to a perjury charge? That would give me
pause.
If perjury may at times be "condoned," as it in fact has in the
cases cited at p. 18, the issue before us then becomes whether, under
the particular circumstances of this case, the offense of perjury may
be excused because the Miranda warning was not given. The Fifth
Circuit was of the view that failure to give Miranda warnings provided
a sufficient reason to excuse perjury. We all seem to agree that the
Miranda warning need not be given. The fulcrum at both courts was
consideration of the Miranda is sue.

,...

I am therefore at a loss as to how we can justify treating the "gut"
issue presented to us.

Mr. Justice Stewart
,.

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 15, 1976

Re: NO. 74-754, UNITED STATES v. MANDUJANO
Dear Chief,
This is in response to your letter of April 13. It is
my understanding that the precise issue presented in this case
and the cases that are being held from the CA 9 and CA 7 is
whether the failure to give Miranda warnings requires the suppression of grand jury testimony in connection with a prosecution
for perjury based on that testimony. I agree with you and Bill
Brennan that on the record in this case there is no basis for concluding that the perjury prosecution must be barred because of
outrageous prosecutorial conduct amounting to a denial of due
process.

,,
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That being so, the issue becomes whether the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination requires suppression of Mandujano's false testimony. I believe that
our prior cases make clear that, even assuming that Miranda
warnings, or some kind of warnings, are required to safeguard
the witness's Fifth Amendment rights, the failure to provide
warnings does not preclude use of false testimony in a perjury
prosecution. Accordingly, I concluded that it is not necessary
to consider in this case whether the failure to give Miranda warnings or any warnings at all would warrant the suppression of
truthful grand jury testimony of a "putative defendant" in connection with his prosecution for a substantive crime.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
,,

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 12, 1976

'
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'•

Re:

74-754 - U. S. v. Mandujano

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Potter's concurring opinion prompts me to add
the enclosed insert at page 17, at the end of footnote 7.

J
v...,

V
United States v. Mandujano
No. 7(1.-754
INSERT -

P. 17
INSERT - P. 17, fn. 7 (add at end of footnote)
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart
suggests that an unwarned grand jury witness who perjures
himself has no claim by reason of the absence of warnings.

Under that rationale, a witness, under oath to

tell the truth, but not specifically warned that he can
refuse to answer a potentially inculpatory question, can
properly be convicted of perjury.

Whatever \ the merits of

the Miranda doctrine as originally conceived, the policy
consideration underlying that holding was the desire to
secure the Fifth Amendment privilege in circumstances
where, without warnings, a person in police custody might
not have the ability to choose freely to remain silent.
Cf. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S.

__

,

--

(1976).

Such considerations, among others, led the Court of
Appeals in the present case to conclude that a perjury
conviction could not stand if the witness had not been
affirmatively or specifically alerted to the need for
exercising the privilege.

By refraining to suggest that

Miranda does not apply and at the same time indicating
the
that/absence of any warnings affords no defense in any
perjury case, the concurring opinion would resolve an
issue not before us and thus more appropriately left to
another day:

whether a

without any warning of
-r-ce. 1110 ,-.)1

the privilege, when put

either incrimi-

nating himself or lying, has any defense to a perjury
charge.

Here the colloquy between the prosecutor and

the witness reveals conclusively that the latter was
abundantly aware of his Fifth Amendment privilege, and
there can be no doubt that respondent was fully capable
of avoiding any such dilemma as postulated above.

~ttpuuu {!Jo-nrl of tqt~h ,jtaftg
~as1tingtnn, ~- QJ. 21lffeJl.,
CHAMeERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 14, 1976 /

Re:

74-754 - United States v. Mandujano

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Some reactions to my memorandum of May 12, proposing a
possible expansion of note 7, page 17, persuade me that,
given the 11 May-June syndrome, 11 it is better to leave the
situation substantially as it was prior to my memorandum
of May 12.

I

I will therefore plan on having the opinion ready for
announcement next Wednesday in the form of the circulation
dated April 6, except that the final sentence of note 7, page 17,
will be omitted and the final sentence, note 9, page 19, will
be omitted to avoid repetition.
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